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Abstract
To detect frauds from some internal participants or external attackers, some verifiable threshold
quantum secret sharing schemes have been proposed. In this paper, we present a new verifiable thresh-
old structure based on a single qubit using bivariate polynomial. First, Alice chooses an asymmetric
bivariate polynomial and sends a pair of values from this polynomial to each participant. Then Alice
and participants implement in sequence unitary transformation on the d-dimensional quantum state
based on unbiased bases, where those unitary transformations are contacted by this polynomial. Fi-
nally, security analysis shows that the proposed scheme can detect the fraud from external and internal
attacks compared with the exiting schemes and is comparable to the recent schemes.
keywords Verifiability Mutually unbiased bases Unitary transformation Secret sharing scheme
1 Introduction
Quantum secret sharing is an important issue in quantum cryptography, which combines classical secret
sharing and quantum theory and plays an important role in applied cryptography. It means that classic
or quantum secret information can be divided into shares by a dealer among participants, so that only
authorized participants can recover the secret, and any one or more unauthorized participants can not re-
cover the secret. In a (t,n)-threshold quantum secret sharing scheme, the dealer splits secret into n shares
sending them to each of n participants where any set of t or more shareholders can recover the shared
secret cooperatively, however less than t shareholders can not recover it. Hillery et al.[1] firstly proposed
quantum secret sharing (QSS) based on the quantum correlation of Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ)
states in 1999. The main idea of this scheme is that an unknown quantum state is shared between two
participants and only restored collaboratively. The fundamental theory of quantum determines that the
QSS schemes are more secure than the classic ones. There are many QSS schemes [2-9] that have been
proposed. For example, a quantum secret sharing scheme was constructed using the product state rather
than the entangled state in [4], such that the scheme is applicable when the number of participants is
expanded. In addition, a (n,n)-threshold quantum secret sharing scheme that shares multiple classic in-
formation was proposed based on a single photon in [6]. Most of these schemes do not take into account
two major security issues: during the secret distribution phase, an attacker may impersonate the dealer to
send false information to the shareholders and during the recovery phase, some participants may provide
false shares, so they cannot recover the correct secret. In 1985, Chor et al. [10] proposed the concept
of verifiable secret sharing (VSS) and gave a complete scheme that verifiable problem was solved effec-
tively. The verifiable secret sharing scheme has attracted the attention of many scholars, because it can
prevent dishonest participants from providing false information during the secret recovery stage, and it
can also prevent external fraud from pretending to send false information to participants. With the advent
of quantum algorithms [11, 12], the theory of quantum secret sharing (VQSS) [7-9] can be further de-
veloped. For example, an identity-based quantum signature encryption algorithm was constructed in [8],
which makes the secret share and signature are safe under the choice of plaintext attack. What’s more, a
verifiable (t,n)-threshold QSS scheme with sequential communication was proposed in [9], in which the
property of mutually unbiased bases is used [13]. The quantum state is measured with the basis
{∣∣ϕl0〉}l
by the last participant Bobt until the dealer Alice and all participants Bob1,Bob2, · · · ,Bobt implement
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unitary transformation on the three single-bit quantum states sequentially. Then the measurement result
is sent to each participant. In the secret recovery phase, participants exchange the information of unitary
transformation so that each participant can recover secrets, where the first two qubits are used to share
the two secrets, and the third single qubit is used as the verification information. This scheme combines
the Shamir secret sharing scheme with sequential communication in the d-dimensional quantum system,
and adds the third qubit as the authentication information, which easily identifies the spoof or attack.
However, the scheme has two drawbacks: Firstly, when participants exchange classic information, they
are vulnerable to external attackers, which will result in the scheme to be unsafe. Secondly, the third
qubit used as verification information is wasted and the verification formula p10 = p
2
0p
3
0 mod d will be
established with a certain probability, even if there are dishonest participants.
In this paper,the scheme in Ref.[9] is improved on these two issues and a new QSS scheme based
on the property of mutually unbiased bases [13] is proposed. Compared with the original scheme, this
paper has the following advantages:
(a).During the secret distribution phase, the distributor chooses an asymmetric binary polynomial
to replace the original unary polynomial. The classical information of the participants’ unitary trans-
formation is obtained by their respective secret shares, which will be supervised by the dealer so as to
make sure that participants are honest. Consequently, the verifiability of the scheme is achieved with less
authentication information.
(b).This scheme is supervised by the dealer to ensure that each participant is honest, thereby realizing
the practicality and feasibility of the scheme.
(c).If a dishonest participant is found during the secret sharing phase, the dishonest participant will be
found and removed. In the next secret sharing process, the dealer simply re-prepares a binary polynomial
and a quantum state to recover the secret, which will prevent internal attacks.
(d).The classic information exchanged by the participants during the secret recovery phase can be
protected by paired keys, so that the classic information will not be leaked, and external attacks can be
prevented.
The organization of this paper is as follows: In Sect.2, we give the preliminary knowledge related to
bivariate polynomials and mutually unbiased bases as well as the construction of unitary transformation.
In Sect.3, we proposed a new verifiable (t,n)-threshold QSS scheme with sequential communication.
The security of the scheme is analyzed in Section 4. Next, we give a comparison of the basic properties
among our scheme and others in Section 5. Finally, the conclusion is given in Sect.6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce the knowledge related to bivariate polynomials and mutually unbi-
ased bases as well as the construction of unitary transformation.
2.1 Binary polynomials
A binary polynomial having degree t − 1 for x and h− 1 for y is defined as
F (x,y) = a00+ a10x+ a01y+ a11xy+ a20x
2+ a02y
2+ a12xy
2+ a21x
2y+ a22x
2y2+ · · ·+
at−1,h−1xt−1yh−1 mod d,
(1)
where ai j ∈ Fd , i ∈ {0,1, · · · t − 1} , j ∈ {0,1, · · ·h− 1}, xi is the public information of Bobi. d is
required to be an odd prime number in this paper. The verifiable secret sharing based on binary
polynomial is called BVSS. One advantage of BVSSs is that it can provide shared keys for any two
participants Bobi and Bob j in the information exchange process, so they can be protected. It can be
divided into two categories:
(a).Verifiable secret sharing scheme based on symmetric bivariate polynomial (SBVSSs)[15-18]. For
SBVSSs, the dealer Alice chooses a symmetric binary polynomial F(x,y) and computes F(xi,y) mod d
then sending it to Bobi through the secure channel. Any two participants Bobi and Bob j compute
F(xi,x j) and F(x j,xi) respectively,using the pair as a shared key between them.
(b).Verifiable secret sharing scheme based on asymmetric bivariate polynomial (ABVSSs) [14,15]. For
ABVSSs, the dealer Alice chooses an asymmetric binary polynomial, computing
F(xi,y) mod d,F(x,xi) mod d and sending them to Bobi through the secure channel. According to
F(xi,y) mod d and F(x,x j) mod d, Bobi and Bob j calculate F(xi,x j) respectively as a pairwise shared
key between them, where i, j ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n}.
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2.2 Mutually unbiased bases
Two sets of standard orthogonal bases A1 = {|ϕ1〉 , |ϕ2〉 , · · · , |ϕd〉} and A2 = {|ψ1〉 , |ψ2〉 , · · · , |ψd〉} are
defined over a d-dimensional complex space in Ref. [19, 20] if the following relationship is satisfied:
|〈ϕi |ψi〉|= 1√
d
. (2)
If any two of the set of standard orthogonal bases{A1,A2, · · · ,Am} in space are unbiased, then this set is
called an unbiased bases set. Besides, it can be found d+ 1 mutually unbiased bases if d is an odd
prime number. First, the computation base is expressed as {|k〉 |k ∈ D} ,D = {0,1, · · · ,d − 1}, and the
remaining groups can be expressed as:
∣∣∣v( j)l 〉= 1√
d
d−1
∑
k=0
wk(l+ jk) |k〉, (3)
where j and l represent respectively the number of the mutually unbiased bases and the number of the
vectors, w = e
2pii
d ,l, j ∈ D. These mutually unbiased bases satisfy the following conditions:∣∣∣∣〈v( j)l
∣∣∣∣v( j′)l
〉∣∣∣∣= 1√
d
, j 6= j′. (4)
2.3 The construction of unitary transformation
Next, we introduce the two unitary transformations Xd and Yd that we need to use in this paper. In
Ref.[13], they can be expressed as:
Xd =
d−1
∑
m=0
wm |m〉 〈m|. (5)
Implementing on
∣∣∣v( j)l 〉 in turn, we can obtain:
X xdY
y
d
∣∣∣v( j)l 〉= X xd
(
d−1
∑
m=0
wym
2 |m〉〈m|
)(
1√
d
d−1
∑
k=0
wk(l+ jk) |k〉
)
= 1√
d
d−1
∑
m=0
wxm |m〉〈m|
d−1
∑
k=0
wk(l+( j+y)k) |k〉
= 1√
d
d−1
∑
k=0
wk((l+x)+( j+y)k) |k〉
=
∣∣∣v( j+y)l+x .〉
(6)
For the convenience of expression, X xdY
y
d is denoted as Ux,y, that is, Ux,y
∣∣∣v( j)l 〉= ∣∣∣v( j+y)l+x 〉 .
3 Verifiable (t,n)-threshold quantum secret sharing scheme
In this section, we construct a verifiable (t,n)-threshold quantum secret sharing scheme that includes an
honest dealer Alice and shareholders Bob1,Bob2, · · · ,Bobn.
3.1 Preparation phase
3.1.1 Alice randomly chooses an asymmetric bivariate polynomial of which the form is like formula
mentioned in the previous section 2, where ai j ∈ Fd , i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · t − 1}.
3.1.2 Alice calculates F(xi,y) and F(x,xi) as the secret shares and sends it to Bobi through secure
channel, where xi is the public information of Bobi.
3.1.3 Alice prepares a d-dimensional quantum state |φ〉= ∣∣ϕ00〉= 1√d d−1∑
i=0
|i〉, and performs a unitary
transformationUp0 ,q0 on it, where p0 = S,q0 = s−
t
∑
i=1
F (xi,0),s = F (0,0),p0,q0 ∈ Fd , S is a secret.
3
3.2 Distribution phase
3.2.1 Alice sends the quantum state |φ〉0 =Up0,q0
∣∣ϕ00〉= ∣∣ϕq0p0〉 that she has performed a unitary
transformation on to Bob1 through the secure channel. Then Bob1 performs a unitary transformation
Up1,q1 on the obtained quantum state |φ〉0 to get |φ〉1 =Up1,q1
∣∣ϕq0p0〉= ∣∣∣ϕq0+q1p0+q1〉, where
p1 = F (x1,x1),q1 = F (x1,0), p1,q1 ∈ Fd . Next, the quantum state |φ〉1 performed by Bob1 is sent to
Bob2.
3.2.2 The other participants Bobi repeat the same operation of Bob1 in 3.2.1 , that is , Bobi performs a
unitary transformationUpi,qi on the obtained quantum state |φ〉i−1 from Bobi−1, getting
|φ〉i =Upi,qi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ϕ
i−1
∑
i=0
qi
i−1
∑
i=0
pi
〉
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ϕ
i
∑
i=0
qi
i
∑
i=0
pi
〉
. (7)
Then he sends the quantum state |φ〉i to Bobi+1 through the quantum safe channel until the last
participant Bobt performs the same operation and gets the final state
|φ〉t =Upt ,qt
∣∣∣∣∣∣ϕ
t−1
∑
i=0
qi
t−1
∑
i=0
pi
〉
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ϕ
t
∑
i=0
qi
t
∑
i=0
pi
〉
, (8)
where pi = F(xi,xi),qi = F(xi,0), pi,qi ∈ Fd ,i = 2,3, · · · , t .
3.2.3 Since ki j = F(xi,x j) is used as a shared key between participants Bobi and Bob j, Bobi can
calculate c′i = Eki j(pi),c
′′
i = Eki j(qi) and send them to Bob j. After receiving the ciphertext c
′
i,c
′′
i , he can
infer pi = Dki j (c
′
i),qi = Dki j (c
′′
i ), where Eki j(pi),Eki j(qi) represents classical encryption of plaintext
pi,qi, Dki j (c
′
i),Dki j (c
′′
i ) represents classical decryption of ciphertext c
′
i,c
′′
i , i, j ∈ {1,2, · · · , t},i 6= j.
3.3 Measurement phase
3.3.1 After receiving pi,qi, by the binary Lagrange interpolation formula, Bob j can calculate
s′ =
t
∑
i=1

F (xi,0) t∏
k=1
k 6=i
xk
xk − xi

= t∑
i=1

qi t∏
k=1
k 6=i
xk
xk − xi

 (9)
where i, j ∈ {1,2, · · · , t}. At first, the last participant Bobt performs a unitary transformationUpt ,qt on
the obtained quantum state |φ〉t−1 to obtain |φ〉t , and then he select bases
{∣∣∣∣v(s′)l
〉}
to measure the
quantum state |φ〉t with the measurement result denoted as R′. Next he could calculate c = Ekti(R′) and
sent it to other participants Bobi.
3.3.2 After receiving the ciphertext c from the last participant Bobt , Bobi calculates R
′ = Dkti(c),
where Ekti(R
′) is the classic encryption of R′ sent by Bobt , and Dkti(c) is the classic decryption of
ciphertext c, where i = 1,2, · · · , t − 1.
3.4 Testing phase
3.4.1 For the security of the scheme, the quantum states are randomly selected and detected by Alice
during the process of transmitting the quantum states. Alice requires Bobi to send the calculated s
′ to
her and checks whether it is satisfied. If satisfied, the participants are honest and the scheme continues
because the following formula is true:
t
∑
j=0
qi =
(
s−
t
∑
j=1
qi
)
+
t
∑
j=1
q j mod d = s. (10)
If one or some of the participants calculate s′ = s is not satisfied, it indicates that the participant has
fraudulent behavior, which can be divided into two cases. If s′ = s calculated by the last participant is
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not satisfied, the scheme terminates. If it is found that one or some of the previous participants
Bob1,Bob2, · · · ,Bobt−1 dissatisfy s′ = s, then it move on to the next step.
3.4.2 As long as Alice checks each two participant’s pi, p j that send by Bobi and received by Bob j,
she can find out which participant has fraudulent behavior, and remove it in the next round of secret
sharing scheme, where i, j ∈ {1,2, · · · , t − 1} , i 6= j.
3.4.3 Alice checks each participant’s received R′ sent by the last participant Bobt and examine if the
following is established:
R′ = R = p0+ p1+ · · ·+ pt = S+F (x1,x1)+ · · ·+F (xt ,xt) . (11)
If it is established, the scheme continues; if at least one participant receives R′ such that does not hold,
indicating that the last participant Bobt is dishonest and the scheme is terminated, so Bobt is removed in
the next round of secret sharing.
3.5 Recovery phase
In order to restore the original secret, Bobi can calculate
p0 = R−
t
∑
i=1
pi (12)
and obtain the secret p0 = S. If Alice wants to share multiple secrets, then repeat the above process,
where i = 1,2, · · · , t.
4 Correctness and security
In this section, we mainly account for the correctness analysis and the security of our scheme against
four primary attack: dishonest participant attacks ,the intercept-and-resend attack,
entangle-and-measure attack and collusion attack.
4.1 Correctness analysis
After all participants Bob1,Bob2, · · · ,Bobt complete their operations, the final quantum state is
|φ〉t =
(
t
∏
k=0
Upk,qk
)
|φ〉=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ϕ
t
∑
k=0
qk
t
∑
k=0
pk
〉
. (13)
Based on the binary Lagrange interpolation formula, they can calculate s after exchanging classic
information pi,qi. The last participant Bobt selects the basis to measure the final state and the measured
result R =
t
∑
i=0
pi is sent to each participant after being encrypted by the shared key, so each participant
can recover the secret p0 = S, where s =
t
∑
i=0
qi mod d.
4.2 Security analysis
The security of the scheme is analyzed in this section.
4.2.1 Participant attack
One or some of the participants use the random numbers replace the real ones for the unitary operation
during the unitary transformation phase. It is checked whether s′ calculated by each participant satisfies
s′ = s in the testing phase is true, so that dishonest participants are found. This indicates that the
participant attack is invalid. Therefore the secret cannot be recovered.
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Table 1: comparison among QSS schemes
Lu[9] Qin[20] New
Access structure (t,n)-threshold -threshold (t,n)-threshold
Dimension of space d d d
Quantum state Three qubits Two qubits Single qubit
Quantum operations The unitary operation The unitary operation The unitary operation
Method Lagrange interpolation,MUB Lagrange interpolation Lagrange interpolation,MUB
Verification of secret Verifiable equation Hash function Supervision of the dealer
Protection of classic information NO - Yes
4.2.2 Intercept-and-resend attack
We suppose that the eavesdropper Eve intercepts the quantum state
∣∣ϕkl 〉 sent by Bobi to Bobi+1, but he
does not know any information about the measurement basis. He can only choose the correct
measurement basis with the probability of 1
/
d. In addition, the measurement result is
S+
i−1
∑
k=1
pi. (14)
If Eve does not know the basis chosen by the participant before, he can only infer the secret of the
dealer with the probability of 1
/
d. In short, Eve cannot obtain the secret with a probability of
exceeding1
/
d in intercept-and-resend attack.
4.2.3 Entangle-and-measure Attack
The eavesdropper Eve entangles the auxiliary quantum state onto the transmitted quantum state or
replaces the quantum state with a new entangled state, but the entanglement exchange causes the
quantum state to be in a mixed state. There is no way to distinguish, so he cannot obtain any
information about the measurement basis and participant’s pi,qi. This will also make formula and are
false, so it will be found by Alice.
4.2.4 Collusion attack
Participant collusion is a more destructive attack than an external attack. It is assumed that in the worst
case only the dealer Alice and one participant are honest, and the remaining t − 1 participants will
conduct a collusion attack that they exchange their pi only to get
t−1
∑
i=1
pi but could not get the original
secret p0. Therefore, it is invalid with collusion attack.
5 Comparison
Here, we give a comparison of the basic properties in our scheme and other d-dimensional QSS
schemes. The dealer in Lu’s scheme [9] can share three secrets by delivering three identical states
sequentially among participants. To recover the secret, they perform proper unitary operations on a
vector of a set of MUBs and the qubits are measured in an appointed basis by the last participant. After
that, they exchange the random numbers that are embedded in the qubits and vulnerable to eavesdropper
to recover the secrets. Besides, a verifiable (t,n)-threshold quantum secret sharing scheme is proposed
by using-dimensional Bell state and the Lagrange interpolation. The scheme is verified by Hash
function with less verification information. We give a new verifiable QSS scheme based on single qubit
in this paper by using sequential communication of a single quantum d-dimensional system and the
Lagrange interpolation. A detailed comparison of these schemes is presented in Table 1.
So it can be seen that
(a) Our scheme achieves the verifiability with less verification information under the supervision of the
dealer Alice.
(b)The scheme adds shared keys to protect the share information that needs to be exchanged, thereby
making this scheme be more secure for external attacks.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, a new verifiable (t,n)-threshold quantum secret sharing scheme based on binary
polynomial and mutually unbiased bases is proposed in combination with the Ref.[9]. Compared with
the original scheme, our scheme makes a dealer supervise whether each participant is honest, thereby
achieving verifiability. If the dishonest participants were found during the testing phase, he can be
eliminated to prevent internal attacks. This paper also uses a binary polynomial to add a pair of shared
keys to ensure confidentiality. Participants can be protected by paired keys when exchanging classic
information in the recovery phase, which is more secure than the original one with preventing external
attacks. The security analysis illuminates that our scheme can resist the participants attack, the
intercept-and-resend attack, the entangle-and-measure attack and the collusion attack. Therefore, the
security of the scheme is significantly improved. Compared with other existing verifiable schemes, the
verifiable mechanism based on the supervision of the dealer is implemented in this paper, which will
not waste extra quantum states with less authentication information.
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